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The Lack of Judicial Direction in Political
Gerrymandering: An Invitation to
Chaos Following the 1990 Census
by
STEPHEN

J.

THOMAS*

Every ten years, the United States Census Bureau conducts a nation-wide census. These undertakings often reveal shifts in population,
and thus affect the composition of legislative bodies' whose membership
is elected on the basis of population distribution, such as the United
States House of Representatives and state senates and assemblies. 2 Each
state legislature is responsible for redrawing legislative districts within its
state for both state and congressional elections to reflect these population
changes. 3 Gerrymandering 4 occurs when state legislators intentionally
manipulate these boundaries for their political advantage. 5 Gerrymandering may be accomplished through a variety of methods, including
malapportionment, when the legislature fails to adjust districts according
to demographic changes, 6 and racial gerrymandering, when an appor*
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Class.
1. See e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective numbers.")
2. See CAL. CoNsT. art. XXI, § I (demanding reapportionment of state Senate and Assembly districts).
3. In order to comply with the Constitution's equal protection clause, state legislatures
must reapportion districts at least once every 10 years. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,

583-84 (1964).
4. The term "gerrymander" was coined by combining the last name of Eldridge Gerry
with the word "salamander" in order to describe the "fancied resemblance to a salamander...
of the irregularly shaped outline of an election district in northeastern Mass. that had been
formed for partisan purposes in 1812 during Gerry's governorship" of that State. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 952 (unabr. ed. 1961).
5. Id. ("To divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair
way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of
districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as
possible.").
6. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1962) (referring to legislative districts of
varying populations as "malapportionment"). Malapportionment has been referred to as a
"silent gerrymander" because the group in control of the legislature retains political power by
refusing to revise outdated apportionment schemes. See D. Saffell, Legislative Apportionment:
Interpretation by the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts 3 (1987 Annual Meeting of the
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tionment plan is specifically devised to reduce the political power of a
racial minority. 7 This Note concerns political gerrymandering, the purposeful discrimination by one political party against another for partisan
purposes. 8
Following the 1980 census charges of political gerrymandering flew
when state legislatures were accused of joining with their governors 9 to
pass reapportionment legislation designed to reduce the power of the opposing political party. 10 Once the 1990 census is complete, legislators
again will return to their decennial task of reapportionment. 1 Without
clear judicial standards aimed at curbing legislative misconduct, the possibility of unfair representation from gerrymandering will again threaten
the integrity of the political process.
In 1986, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision of
Davis v. Bandemer,12 which attempted to restrict the ability of state legislatures to engage in political gerrymandering. Bandemer represents the
Court's latest effort in twenty-seven years of cases aimed at putting an
end to unfair discrimination through legislative apportionment. 13 Two
years after Bandemer, a federal district court in Badham v. Eu 14 became
the first court to apply and interpret the Bandemer decision. Neither
Bandemer nor Badham, however, provide sufficient guidance to state
legislatures for the reapportionments that are likely to follow the 1990
Amer. Political Science Assn., Chicago, Ill., Sept. 3-6, 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (a copy
is on file at the Hastings Law Journal).
7. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986)
8. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986).
9. Because a governor must sign reapportionment legislation into law, gerrymandering
is most likely to occur when the governor and the majority of state legislators are members of
the same political party. See e.g., Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(reapportionment legislation drafted by Democratic majority in legislature and signed into law
by Democratic governor only hours before he left office), affd. mem, 109 S. Ct. 829 (1989).
10. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115 (alleged political gerrymandering by Republican majority in Indiana against Democratic minority); Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 669-70 (alleged political gerrymandering by Democratic majority in California against Republican minority).
11. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. XII, § 1 (requiring the legislature "[i]n the year following
the year in which the national census is taken ... to adjust the boundaries of the Senatorial,
Assembly, [and] Congressional" districts).
"Apportionment" refers to the determination of the number of representatives which a
state, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
91 (5th ed. 1979). "Districting" is the establishment of the precise geographical boundaries of
each such unit. Id. at 427.
12. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
13. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962), the United States Supreme Court made its
first major step in reviewing legislative apportionment plans when it held that allegations of
unequal voting rights due to legislative districts with unequal populations presented a justiciable, constitutional claim. Id. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
14. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mem., 109 S. Ct. 829 (1989).
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census. Instead, the standards suggested by these cases provide an open
invitation to political gerrymandering.1 5
Section I of this Note reviews the origins of gerrymandering and the
courts' initial reluctance to provide a judicial remedy. This section examines malapportionment and documents the Supreme Court's first significant entry into the "political thicket" 16 of apportionment in Baker v.
Carr17 and the subsequent development of the "one person, one vote"
standard in Gray v. Sanders. I Since Gray, the Court repeatedly has
struggled to apply this standard to various forms of gerrymandering.
Section II describes the courts' first steps to confront political gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer 19 and Badham v. Eu.20 By -holding
political gerrymandering to be justiciable, the United States Supreme
Court demonstrated a willingness to subject the issue to judicial scrutiny.
Bandemer held that an apportionment scheme is unconstitutional if it
intentionally discriminates against an identifiable group and has an actual discriminatory effect against that group. 2 1 Badham became the first
case to apply and interpret the Bandemer standard. In both cases, however, the court held that the challenged apportionment plans were constitutional. 22 This section analyzes the factors that influenced the courts'
decisions.
Section III proposes a standard for evaluating political gerrymandering claims. A group challenging an apportionment plan must establish that the plan has a discriminatory effect. In order to do so, it must
satisfy a two-pronged effects test: (1) the group must show that it will
suffer disproportionate election losses over a prolonged period of time,
and (2) it must suffer the loss of its power to elect a representative of its
choice. This standard is based on the assertion that the power to elect a
representative is at the heart of the political process. Political gerrymandering, therefore, involves the loss of a group's power to elect a representative because a legislature has divided voting districts unfairly in order
to dilute that group's political strength. This proposal provides a clear,
15. See Alfange, Gerrymanderingand the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the Thicket at
Last, 1986 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 175, 251 ("[Bandemer] did not provide the lower courts with the
remotest help in devising the methodology by which to ascertain whether a discriminatory
effect above a critical threshold level had been demonstrated."). A number of significant federal cases likely will follow on the heels of Bandemer. See D. Saffell, supra note 6, at 29 ("Just
as Baker v. Carrencouraged litigation in the 1960s, Davis v. Bandemer will spawn a host of
cases in the 1990s.").
16. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
17. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
18. 372 U.S. 368, 382 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
20. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mem., 109 S.Ct. 829 (1989).
21. 478 U.S. at 127.
22. Id. at 143; Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 670.
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future

The Origins of Gerrymandering and the "One Person, One

Vote" Standard
Historically, state legislatures have used various apportionment tactics to ensure political advantage. Prior to 1962, political parties obtained an advantage primarily through legislative inaction, maintaining
their power base by ignoring shifts in population.2 3 This so-called malapportionment resulted in legislative districts of unequal population. 24 After the Supreme Court held that malapportionment violated the equal
protection clause, 25 legislatures shifted to other methods of manipulating
political representation. For example, legislatures diluted the voting
strength of minorities by creating larger multimember districts in which
more than one representative is elected to each district. 26 As a result, a
minority group that would otherwise be able to elect a representative in a
smaller, single-member district is submerged into a population sufficiently large to prevent the minority group's candidate from being
elected. In other instances, legislatures have impaired the ability of racial
minorities to elect a representative of their choice by drawing singlemember district boundaries that divide racial communities among
27
predominantly white districts.
23. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 569-70 (1964) (no reapportionment of seats in
Alabama Legislature for over 60 years); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2 (1963) (Georgia
congressional districts not reapportioned for over 30 years). California's current constitutional provision includes an equal population requirement. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § l(b)
("The population of all districts of a particular type shall be reasonably equal.").
24. At a time when the population was shifting from the country to the city, malapportionment resulted in overrepresentation of rural areas and underrepresentation of urban interests. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254-55 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (two counties
in the state with the same number of representatives in the legislature had populations measuring 2,340 and 25,316 people).
25. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566. The Court held that a plan violates equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment because of the failure of "fair and effective representation":
Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly
the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection
Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election
of state legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs
basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based on other factors such as race ....
t
Id. at 565-66.
26. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973); see also Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1, 21 (1975) (reinstating single member senatorial districts absent a significant state interest supporting a departure from single member districts).
27. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986).

July 1989]

JUDICIAL DIRECTION IN GERRYMANDERING

In response to these unfair apportionment schemes, the Supreme
28
Court exposed malapportionment to judicial scrutiny in Baker v. Carr.
The judiciary's attempts to curb gerrymandering in a series of decisions
from Baker to Badham v. Eu 2 9 have been ineffective, however. The following discussion examines these cases and the inadequacy of the Court's
"one person, one vote" standard to deal with political gerrymandering in
the 1990s.
A. Baker v. Carr: The Court Steps into the Apportionment Thicket
For many years, the United States Supreme Court considered the

issue of gerrymandering nonjusticiable because it involved a "political

question."' 30 The Court found legislative district line-drawing to be a
matter of "a peculiarly political nature and therefore [did] not meet [the
requirements] for judicial determination." 3 1 For these reasons, the Court
'32
counseled the judiciary not to enter this "political thicket.
33
In 1962, however, the Court reversed its position in Baker v. Carr.
The plaintiffs in Baker claimed that Tennessee's apportionment scheme,
with legislative districts of varying populations, violated equal protec28. 369 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1962).
29. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mer., 109 S.Ct. 829 (1989).
30. When a court invokes the political question doctrine it refuses to take cognizance of
an issue because of its purely political nature, or because it involves a determination that would
encroach upon the executive or legislative branches. A court, therefore, dismisses a political
question as "nonjusticiable." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-10 (1962).
For a critique of the political question doctrine, see R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONME14T IN LAW AND POLITICS 101-02 (1968):
The "political question" concept is one of the most tantalizing of all American
constitutional law principles, and by nature indefinable because it is really not a
"principle" at all. Its elusiveness proceeds from the fact that it is more a rule of
expediency than a rule of reason. It is designed to cover areas where judicial wisdom
fails for lack of guiding standards, or judicial power is undermined by prospective
inability to shape or enforce a remedy. It is a self-imposed limitation yielding judicial
disengagement from an issue or an entire case.
To the cynical, aided by the Court's inability to articulate clearly the metes and
bounds of the doctrine, and imbued with the American tendency to wrap judges in
the- robes of philosopher-kings, the "political question" doctrine is an abdication of
responsibility.
31. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
Cases presenting other issues traditionally considered nonjusticiable include Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 455-56 (1939) (issues involving the constitutional amendment process);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (matters of high policy dealing with
international relations); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109-10 (1861) (interstate relations such as extradition); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 40-42 (1849) (the
legitimacy of competing local governments); and Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DaU.) 199, 260
(1796) (treaties).
32. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
33. 369 U.S. 186, 230-36 (1962).
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tion. 34 The plaintiffs charged that although between 1901 and 1961, Tennessee experienced substantial growth and shifting of its population from
the country to the cities, 35 the state legislature had refused to reapportion
its legislative districts. In finding Tennessee's apportionment scheme to
be justiciable, the Baker Court articulated the six factors it used to determine whether an issue was nonjusticiable: (1) is there a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" to a coordinate political
department; (2) would adjudication of the issue demonstrate a "lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government;" (3) is there the absence of "judicially discoverable and manageable standards;" (4) is there
a need for the court to avoid an "initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion;" (5) is there the unusual need to adhere
to a political decision; and (6) is there "the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements ... -"36 Finding none of these factors
present as a bar to justiciability, 37 the Court remanded the case to the
federal district court and directed it to decide whether Tennessee's ap38
portionment plan violated the equal protection clause.
Because the merits of the case were not before it, the Baker Court
did not provide a standard for determining when a legislative district is
malapportioned. 39 In the cases following Baker, however, the Court continued to confront problems of large population differences in many state
and congressional legislative districts.
B.

The Struggle to Apply the "One Person, One Vote" Standard

Shortly after Baker, the Court, in Gray v. Sanders,4° struck down
Georgia's county-unit system for state-wide elections, for the first time
formally referring to the concept of political equality as "mean[ing] only
one thing - one person, one vote."'4' Following Gray the Court reviewed Georgia's system of apportionment of congressional districts in
Wesberry v. Sanders.42 Applying the "one person, one vote" standard,
34. Id. at 187.
35. Tennessee's population in 1901 was 2,020,616 persons, 487,380 of whom were eligible
to vote. By 1960, the state's population had grown to 3,567,089, 2,092,891 of whom were
eligible to vote. Id. at 192.
36. Id. at 217.
37. The Court summarized its analysis:
We have no question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of government
coequal with this Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of our government abroad,
or grave disturbance at home .... Nor need the applicants ...ask the Court to enter
upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.
Id. at 226.
38. Id. at 237.
39. Id. at 198.
40. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
41. Id. at 381.
42. 376 U.S. 1 (1963).
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the Court required that reapportionment plans maintain legislative districts with "as nearly as is practicable" 43 equal populations so that a person's vote in one district would be worth as much as a person's vote in
another district. 44 Georgia's congressional districts at the time had population disparities of nearly three to one, and the state had not reapportioned in over thirty years. 45 One year later, in Reynolds v. Sims,4 6 the
Court required that state legislative districts be apportioned on a population basis. Alabama's legislative districts had not been reapportioned in
over sixty years, and, as a result, had population differences of up to
forty-one to one in the state senate and up to sixteen to one in the state
assembly. 4 7 The Court reviewed three proposed apportionment plans
and held all of them to be constitutionally invalid because legislative districts would not be apportioned on a population basis under any of the
plans. 48 The Court then upheld the lower court's decision to order reapportionment for the upcoming election as a temporary measure by using
the best parts of two proposed plans and to defer a final judgment in
order to give the new legislature time to enact a permanent reapportion49
ment within the mandated population guidelines.
The Supreme Court's initially careful limitation in its decisions to
correcting unfair representation through the "one person, one vote" standard became somewhat looser. Legislatures had responded by creating
multimember districts, in which more than one person is elected to represent a larger legislative district, in order to discriminate against racial
minorities. Multimember districts diluted the voting strength of minority groups by creating pools of voters large enough to defeat a candidate
that could otherwise be elected in a single-member district. 50 In White v.
Regester,51 the Court held that a Texas multimember legislative district
plan canceling out the voting strength of minority groups was unconstitutional despite roughly equal population between districts. The Court
held that the creation of multimember districts that submerged racial
43. Id. at 7-8.
44. Id. ("To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would... run
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government."). The Court invoked article I,
section 2 of the United States Constitution to enforce equal population in congressional districts: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States.... Representatives ...shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers.. ." U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cls. I & 3.
45. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2.
46. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
47. Id. at 545.
48. Id. at 570-75.
49. Id. at 586-87.
50. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973). For a description of vote dilution in
multimember districts see supra text at note 27.
51. 412 U.S. 755, 763-65 (1973).
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and ethnic minorities constituted an abridgement of their right to participate in the political processes by electing legislators of their choice. 52 In
Thornburg v. Gingles,53 black voters in North Carolina claimed that legislative redistricting constituted an impermissible racial gerrymander.
The Court held that minority voters are discriminated against when an
or cancel[s] out their ability to elect
apportionment plan "minimize[s]
'54
their preferred candidates.
Once the Court held that apportionment plans could be unconstitutional despite equal population among districts, political gerrymandering
appeared to be the next target. As Dean Alfange, Jr. noted:
[o]nce it was recognized that the rule of "one person, one vote" was
not enough to protect the right to fair representation, the next step-to
equate the political gerrymander with the racial gerrymander-was
big one. Indeed, the step was logically easier to take than to
not a 55
avoid.

The Court, however, has been slow to recognize gerrymandering against
political groups, preferring instead to remain tied to the "one person, one
vote" standard.
C. The Deceptive Precision of the "One Person, One Vote" Standard Leads
to Political Gerrymandering
The Court's initial "one person, one vote" decisions involved population disparities between legislative districts of as much as forty-one to
one. 56 While "one person, one vote" was implemented to rectify these
wide disparities, the Court, in a malapportionment case, stressed that it
was not insisting on absolute equality in population, stating that
"[m]athematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement." ' 57 In later cases, however, when the Court was faced
with a new type of gerrymandering, political gerrymandering, the Court
chose to apply the old "one person, one vote" test that was developed for
malapportionment cases. As a result, the Court abandoned its earlier
warnings by insisting on precise population equality between legislative
districts.
An example of the Court's strict application of the "one person, one
vote" standard is Kirkpatrick v. Preissler.58 In Kirkpatrick, the Court
struck down a Missouri congressional districting plan on malapportionment grounds in which the largest and smallest districts differed from
52.

Id. at 769-70.

53.

412 U.S. 755, 763-65 (1973).

54. Id. at 48.
55. Alfange, supra note 15, at 207.
56. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964).
57. Id. at 577; see also Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931) ("the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints").

58.

394 U.S. 526 (1969).
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ideal size by only three percent.5 9 The Court required the State to "make
a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality ....
[and to]
justify each variance, no matter how small." 60 The Court thus traded its
concept of "fair and effective representation," 61 for mere head-counting.
In a companion case, Wells v. Rockefeller,62 the Court struck down
a New York congressional districting plan drafted by the Democratic
majority despite population variances of only 6.6 percent. 63 Plaintiffs asserted that the plan violated both the equal population mandate of "one
person, one vote" and that the plan represented a political gerrymander." The Court, however, refused to recognize the political gerrymandering claim and, instead, struck down the plan on malapportionment
grounds. 65 The decision opened the door to egregious political gerrymandering in New York. For instance, the legislature adopted the origi'66
nal plan "as a means to keep regions with distinct interests intact.
After this plan was struck down, the Republicans took control of the
legislature and drafted a plan more favorable to Republicans. The new
plan ignored political boundaries and lacked any consideration of compact districts. 67 As a result, urban centers, such as New York City, were
cut up with portions joined to suburban and rural areas in order to reduce the number of Democrats in each district. 68 Nevertheless, when
59. Id. at 528-29 (the largest district's population was 445,523; the smallest district's population was 419,721; the ideal size was 431,981). In addition, the apparent precision of these
numbers is illusory because the census data relied on in Kirkpatrick was nine years old. Id.
60. Id. at 530-31 (emphasis added); see also White v. Weiser 412 U.S. 783, 785, 790
(1973) (Texas congressional plan with an average deviation of less than one percent was unconstitutional); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 547-49 (1969) (New York congressional
districting plan struck down despite population variances of only 6.6%). But see Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 325-28 (1973) (Virginia apportionment plan with a 16.4% population deviation upheld because Virginia attempted to preserve political boundaries). The Court
in Mahan applied a different standard to state legislative redistricting, permitting more flexibility in population deviations. Id. at 320-25. The Court permitted a state to follow political
subdivision lines, such as county or city borders, even if it resulted in districts of slightly
different populations. The Court reasoned that because there are invariably more state legislative seats than congressional seats, it was more feasible for a state to use political subdivision
lines in drawing new state legislative districts while still ensuring adequate representation. Id.
at 321.
61. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66.
62. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
63. Id. at 547-49; cf Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (Court struck down population variations around 100%); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 255 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (Court struck down population variations of up to 110%).
64. Wells, 394 U.S. at 544.
65. Id.
66. 394 U.S. at 546.
67. See Alfange, supra note 15, at 197.
68. See Baker, One Man, One Vote, and "PoliticalFairness't-Or,How the Burger Court
Found Happiness by Rediscovering Reynolds v. Sims, 23 EMORY L.J. 701, 712-13 (1974) (author describes with irony how the Supreme Court's decision in Wells led to greater gerrymandering in New York).
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this plan also was challenged, the Court upheld the new plan as constitutional. 69 Thus, the Court's insistence in Wells on "one person, one vote"
70
resulted in worse gerrymandering.
Later cases and commentators criticized Kirkpatrick and Wells for
relying too heavily on "one person, one vote."' 71 Justice Fortas warned
that reliance on precise population equality would give a legislature the
freedom to run a district line down the middle of the corridor of an
apartment house if it pleased, so long as the plan remained within population guidelines. 72 Wells v. Rockefeller illustrates the consequences of
this "inflexible insistence upon mathematical exactness, with no toler73
ance for reality."
The ultimate weakness of the one person, one vote standard is that it
fails to remedy the problem of legislatures using modem computer technology in order to gerrymander for partisan advantage. As one observer
has noted, limiting itself to mere head-counting, the Court "turn[ed] its
back on today's reality of modem technology ... where the computer
revolution makes it possible to not only distinguish between Democrats
and Republicans, but which type of Democrat or Republican 74 is desirable in a particular district. Computer technology adds both speed and
precision to the reapportionment process that was unthinkable when the
one person, one vote standard was developed. For instance,
after the legislator ... has specified which counties or precincts should
make up the proposed reapportionment plan in a state, the computer
69. Wells v. Rockefeller, 398 U.S. 901, 901 (1970) (upholding second districting plan),
aff'g 311 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
70. See, e.g., Hess, Beyond Justiciability: Political Gerrymandering After Davis v.
Bandemer, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 207, 250 (1987) ("A singular emphasis on population equality alone is an invitation to gerrymander.").
71. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748-49 (1973) (criticizing Kirkpatrick and
Wells for their overemphasis on "precise mathematical equality" to the exclusion of all other
considerations, thus opening the way for denial of "fair and effective representation" by other
means); see also Alfange supra note 15, at 196 (through its strict reliance on population equality the Kirkpatrick Court "invited, encouraged, and rewarded gerrymandering" by other methods); Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade For the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote'" 1969
Sup. CT. REV. 219, 219 (courts "apparently forgot that the problem was political and that the
issue was political representation, not numbers"); D. Saffell, supra note 6, at 8 (noting the
widespread criticism of the Kirkpatrick decision, both within the court and among
commentators).
72. Kirkpatrick v. Preissler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. Interview with United States Representative William M. Thomas, in Washington,
D.C. (June 27, 1988) [hereinafter Thomas Interview].
Representative Thomas is a five-term Republican from the 20th District of California. As
a member of the California Republican congressional delegation he was subject to the legislative reapportionment and was a plaintiff in Badham v. Eu. In addition, Thomas is considered
a leading expert on reapportionment among California Republicans. See THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 124 (1988) ("Thomas is... one of his party's leading political tacticians.
He was the California Republicans leading (and unsuccessful) strategist for redistricting.")
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can quickly give a demographic composite of the proposed districts,
including various measures of75population deviations... and a measure
of the district's compactness.
In addition, the computer can provide the legislator with other information such as political registration within the district and a breakdown of ethnic population.7 6 Thus, it is clear that simple numerical
equality between legislative districts will not solve the problem of
gerrymandering.
By 1983, the Court's "inflexible insistence" on population equality

began to show signs of weakening in Karcher v. Daggett.77 In a five to
four decision, the Court struck down New Jersey's reapportionment plan
despite a population difference between the largest and smallest districts
of less than 0.7 percent. 78 The dissenting and concurring opinions, however, strongly urged a departure from the requirement of strict popula-

tion equality.
Justice White, representing the four dissenting justices, harshly criticized the "draconian" reasoning of the majority, contending that the de-

cision was based on "statistically insignificant" population differences

that had no relevant effect on representation. 79 Additionally, in a conCourt should have reccurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the
0
ognized the plan as a political gerrymander.8
The Court had difficulty evaluating the fairness of New Jersey's apportionment plan because the inequities of the plan did not stem from
population differences, but rather from a political gerrymander so extreme that it was referred to as a "'four-star gerrymander that boasts
some of the most bizarrely shaped districts to be found in the nation.' "81
In Karcher, Justices Stevens and Powell recognized the need to address
the issue of political gerrymandering. 82 Three years later, Justices Mar-

shall, White, Brennan, and Blackmun joined Justices Stevens and Powell
75.

A. WOLLOCK, REAPPORTIONMENT LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 56-57 (1980).

76. Id.

In addition, numerous reapportionment maps can be generated for a state in a

few hours. Id. at 54-55.
77. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
78. Id. at 728 (population differences were not the result of good faith efforts to achieve
equality between districts when unaccompanied by sufficient justification).
79. Id. at 766 (White, J., Burger, C.J., Powell, J., Rehnquist, J.dissenting) ("One must
suspend credulity to believe that the Court's draconian response to a trifling 0.6984% maximum deviation promotes"fair and effective representation' for the people of New Jersey.").
80. Id. at 744-45 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his dissent, Justice Powell essentially
agreed with Justice Stevens that partisan gerrymandering was at issue. Id at 786-87 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 762 n.30 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1190
(1982)).
82. Id. at 744, 786. In his dissent, Justice Powell stated that "gerrymandering presents 'a
far greater potential threat to equality of representation' than a state's failure to achieve 'precise adherence to admittedly inexact census figures.'" Id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quotdissenting)).
ing Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969) (White, J.,
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the justiciability of political gerrymandering in Davis v.
in recognizing
3
8

Bandemer.

II.

The Recognition of Political Gerrymandering in Davis v.
Bandemer and Badham v. Eu

The Court decided Davis v. Bandemer 84 in 1986. Two years later,
Badham v. Eu 85 became the first case to apply and interpret Bandemer's
standards for challenging an apportionment plan as a political gerrymander. While previous decisions recognized the justiciability of reapportionment in the context of malapportionment 6 and racial
gerrymandering, 87 the Bandemer and Badham courts became the first
decisions to recognize the justiciability of political gerrymandering. Despite breaking this new ground, however, Bandemer and Badham fail to
provide guidance as to what constitutes a political gerrymander. This
lack of clear judicial direction is an open invitation to state legislatures to
gerrymander following the 1990 census.
A. Davis v. Bandemer
In Bandemer, Indiana Democrats alleged that a 1981 reapportionment plan devised by State Republicans constituted a political gerrymander that decreased Democratic representation in the State legislature and
therefore violated their equal protection rights under the fourteenth
amendment. 88 The Republicans conducted the reapportionment process
with little or no regard for the interests of the public or the minority
political party.8 9 For instance, the Republicans did not hold any public
hearings during the mapmaking process, and they gave the Democrats
only forty hours to review a redistricting plan consisting of more than
4000 precincts. 90 In addition, the Republicans supplied neither the public nor any member of the minority party with any information used during the process. 9 ' The Democrats served solely as "advisors" to the
Reapportionment Committee, had no voting rights, and were excluded
from the mapmaking process. 92 On the final day of the legislative ses83. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
84. Id.
85. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, mem., 109 S. Ct. 829 (1989).
86. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 230-36 (1962).
87. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763-65 (1973).
88. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115. At the time of the reapportionment, the Republican
Party held the majority in the Indiana Legislature as well as the governorship. Id. at 113-14.
89. Id. at 175-76 (Powell, J., concurring in part) ("The legislative process consisted of
nothing more than the majority party's private application of computer technology to
mapmaking.").
90. Id. at 176.
91. Id. at 175-76.
92. Id. at 175.
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sion, both houses of the Indiana General Assembly adopted the redistricting plan with votes along party lines. 93 Afterward, it was discovered
that the legislature passed the plan in such a hurry that parts of the state
were "'wholly omitted from the ... legislation.' 94
Following the adoption of the apportionment plan, the Democratic
candidates for the State House of Representatives won only 43 of the 100
House seats despite receiving 51.9 percent of the vote statewide. 95 Specifically, in two counties that were divided into multimember districts,
Democrats won only three of the twenty-one available House seats de96
spite drawing 46.6 percent of the vote.
For the first time, the Court held the issue of political gerrymandering to be justiciable under the equal protection clause. 97 The Court evaluated the issue of whether the case presented a justiciable controversy
using the six factors enunciated in Baker.98 Specifically, the Court found
that there was no risk of becoming involved in a matter more properly
decided by a coequal branch of government and that there was no risk of
foreign or domestic disturbance, both of which would require an unquestioning adherence to a political decision.99 In addition, the Court was
convinced that a judicially manageable standard could be developed to
determine when an apportionment plan constituted a political gerrymander, °0 and it attempted to develop such a standard for defining when an
apportionment plan violates equal protection.' 0
After determining that the plaintiffs' claim was justiciable, the Court
found that the Indiana Democrats failed to prove that the apportionment
scheme violated the fourteenth amendment. 0 2 According to the
Bandemer plurality, an apportionment scheme is unconstitutional if it
intentionally discriminates against an identifiable group and has an ac93. Id. at 176.
94. Id. at 176 n.15 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (quoting Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F.
Supp. 1479, 1484 (S.D. Ind. 1984)). The legislature did not correct this omission until the
following year in an amendment to the apportionment law. Id.
95. Id. at 115.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 125.
98. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
99. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123.
100. Id. ("[W]e are not persuaded that there are no judicially discernable and manageable
standards by which political gerrymander cases are to be decided.").
101. Id. at 127-43. The Court held political gerrymandering to be justiciable by a 6-3
margin. Id. at 113. Of the six justices that held the issue to be justiciable, a plurality of four
held that there was no constitutional violation. Id. at 143 (opinion of White, J., joined by
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) Two justices dissented and would have held the apportionment plan unconstitutional. Id. at 161 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
Three justices concurred in the result on the ground that political gerrymandering claims were
nonjusticiable. Id. at 144 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Burger and Rehnquist, JJ.)
102. Id. at 129-30.
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tual discriminatory effect against that group. 10 3 To clarify the second
part of this standard, the Bandemer Court established a two-pronged test
to determine discriminatory effect. First, a group must demonstrate disproportionate election losses over a period of time and projections that
these losses will continue into the future. 104 Second, a group must have
experienced a loss of power in the political process as a whole,
not merely
05
a loss of power to elect a representative of its choice.'
The threshold element for the Bandemer test is that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against an identifiable political group. The
Bandemer Court held that the Indiana apportionment plan intentionally
discriminated against Democrats. 106 The Court noted that such discrimination often will be easy to prove. The plurality presumed that as long
as the legislature redistricts, "it should not be very difficult to prove that
the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended."' 1 7 Because few legislatures will be able to avoid a claim that the
effects of their redistricting were intended, proof of discriminatory intent
alone will not be sufficient to hold an apportionment plan unconstitutional.108 The Court's downplaying of the intent prong of the test, rather
than insisting on adherence to neutral, nonpartisan motives in reapportionment, suggests that the Bandemer Court recognized politics as an
inextricable part of the process. 0 9 Thus, the heart of the Bandemer test
was the discriminatory effect an apportionment plan had against a group.
The Court, therefore, focused on the effect of the apportionment plan on
110
Indiana Democrats.
103. Id. at 127. Proof of discriminatory intent and effect satisfies the "threshold showing
of discriminatory vote dilution" required to establish a prima facia equal protection violation.
Id. at 143.
104. Id. at 139-40.
105. Id. at 132-34.
106. Id. at 127.
107. Id. at 129.
108. Id. The court emphasized, nevertheless, that a showing of intent would still be required for a gerrymandering claim. Id. at 129 n. I.
109. The Court noted that
whenever a legislature redistricts, those responsible for the legislation will know the
likely political composition of the new districts.
Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment .... It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location

and shape of districts may well determine the political complexion of the area ....
The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.
Id. at 128 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752-53 (1973)).
110. Prior to Bandemer, a large body of statistical data had been compiled in order to
prove discriminatory intent. See generally Cain, Simple vs. Complex Criteriafor PartisanGerrymandering: A Comment on Niemi and Grofman, 33 UCLA L. REV. 213, 214-16 (1985)

(arguing that reliance upon political statistics does not present an appropriate standard for the
Court); Charo, Desiging Mathematical Models to Describe One-Person, One- Vote Compliance
by Unique Governmental Structures: The Case of the New York City Board of Estimate, 53
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The prongs of the Bandemer effects test define the type and the extent of discriminatory effect required to establish a claim. The Court
defined discriminatory effect as that which "occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's
or group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."1'11 In
this first prong of the effects test--consistent degradation of voters' influence-the Bandemer Court examined the length of time that a group
actually is shut out of the political process. The plurality concluded that
only when a history of disproportionate elections leads to a continued
frustration of the will of the voters will the Court find an equal protection
violation. 12 An apportionment scheme, for example, that consigned Indiana Democrats to minority status throughout the decade might be sufficient to establish a continued frustration of the voters' will. 113 In
of a single election are
contrast, as the Bandemer Court held, the results
114

not sufficient to establish discriminatory effect.

The Bandemer Court, however, also stated that continued discrimi-

nation may be proved through projections of future election losses:
"[pirojected election results based on district boundaries and past voting
patterns may certainly support [a gerrymandering] claim, even where no
election has yet been held under the challenged districting."1 1 5 Therefore, the election "results" that would show continued discrimination
against a group of voters may be either actual results of past elections or

projected results of future elections.
FORDHAM L. REv. 735 (analyzing the scope of various statistical models as applied to local
municipalities); G. Gryski & E. Elliott, Systemic Malapportionment in the Lower Houses of
State Legislatures 16-23 (1987 Annual Meeting of the Amer. Political Science Assn., Chicago,
Ill., Sept. 3-6, 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (providing statistical data to illustrate various
models of systematic apportionment) (a copy is on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
With Bandemer'sdeemphasis of discriminatory intent, the contribution of statistical data
in future gerrymandering cases is unclear. Some courts have had trouble sifting through statistical data and have become reluctant to accept the information. Even the district court in
.Bandemer,refused to give credence to any of the multitude of conflicting statistical evidence
introduced at trial, stating that it did not "wish to choose which statistician [was] more credible or less credible." Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd., 478
U.S. 109 (1986). In political gerrymandering cases, a court may use Bandemer's simplified
intent standard as a tool to reduce the amount of statistical data it considers. On the other
hand, some experts believe that Bandemer provides an opportunity to introduce new statistical
models to prove discriminatory effect. See, eg., Hess, supra note 70, at 220 (advocating the use
of political scientists as a major source of assistance to courts after Bandemer).
111. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (opinion of White, J.).
112. Id. at 135-36. Among the factors the plurality considered relevant in determining the
discriminatory effects required to prove a political gerrymandering claim are: actual or projected voting results; unnatural district configurations; and any other evidence that indicated a
design to lock a group into its minority status. Id. at 141.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 135.
115. Id. at 139 n.17 (emphasis in original).
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Under the second prong of Bandemer's effects test, the Court required that members of the political minority be shut out of the political
process "as a whole."' 16 In other words, the Court required that a group
show more than the mere loss of an election; rather, the group must show
the loss of its chance to "effectively influence" the political process." 17
The Court held that Indiana Democrats failed to prove that they had lost
their power to influence the process.1 8 In so holding, however, the plurality provided little guidance as to what evidence it would consider sufficient to support a claim that a group had been excluded from the
political process.
The plurality did discuss what constitutes participation in the political process. The plurality indicated that participation by voters in their
own primary process might be sufficient participation to preclude a gerrymandering claim. 119 In general, members of a group challenging an
apportionment plan must prove "that the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the
group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice."' 120 The plurality concluded that because
Democrats are not excluded from participating in the primary and nominating process within their own party, they are not excluded from the
21
process of electing candidates to office.'
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor raised another possible
consideration to determine whether a group is excluded from the political process. She argued that because the Democratic and Republican
parties are the dominant groups in national politics, they cannot claim
exclusion from the political process. Thus, the general strength of the
national political parties should be sufficient to prevent any member of
either party from claiming exclusion from the political process in any
12 2
individual congressional district.
116. Id. at 132.
117. Id. at 132-33 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 133.
119. Id. at 137.
120. Id. (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973)).
121. Id. The Court wrote:
This participatory approach to the legality of individual multimember districts is not
helpful where the claim is that such districts discriminate against Democrats, for it
could hardly be said that Democrats, any more than Republicans, are excluded from
participating in the affairs of their own party or from the processes by which candidates are nominated and elected.

Id.
122. Id. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's emphasis on the national
strength of political groups subsequently was raised in Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 673
(N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mem., 109 S. Ct. 829 (1989).
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Thus, the second prong of Bandemer's effects test represents a broad
standard in which the mere inability to elect a representative is insufficient to support a political gerrymandering claim. 123 Under the
Bandemer guidelines, the plurality refused to presume that an elected
representative will "entirely ignore" the interests of opposing voters,
"even in a safe district where the losing group loses election after election." 24 According to the plurality, a group that votes for a losing candidate will have as much opportunity to influence the winning candidate
as other voters in the district. Under Bandemer an elected candidate is
viewed as seeking to woo opposing voters and, thus, the candidate's actions are influenced by opposing voter's views.
B. Badham v. Eu: The Bandemer Standard Applied
Two years after the Bandemer decision, a federal district court applied the Bandemer test to a congressional gerrymandering claim125 in
Badham v. Eu. 126 In the suit, California Republicans charged that the
Democratic majority and the outgoing Democratic governor had
designed an apportionment plan that invidiously discriminated against
them.127 Following the 1980 census, the Democratic majority, led by
United States Representative Phillip Burton, 28 engineered an apportionment scheme that resulted in substantial gains by Democrats in the 1982
congressional elections.1 29 In a referendum, California voters rejected
123. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131-32 ("the power to influence the political process is not
limited to winning elections").
124. Id. at 132.
125. Bandemer involved a challenge to a state legislative reapportionment scheme. Id. at
113.
126. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mem., 109 S. Ct. 829 (1989).
127. Id. at 667.
128. Representative Burton took control of redrawing congressional districts from the
state legislature. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1981, at 19, col. 1. Burton's "artwork" was described
as creating havoc among Republicans by repeatedly combining two incumbents into one new
district. Id. at 19, col. 4. In addition, Burton described his handiwork as "gorgeous" in sculpturing a district to enhance his brother's chance of reelection to Congress. Id. at 19, col. 3.
129. Following the 1980 census the California legislature, controlled by a Democratic majority, passed reapportionment legislation that was subsequently signed into law by the Democratic governor. Cal. A.B. 300, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., ch. 537, 1981 Cal. Stat. 2010 (1981)
(reapportionment of State Assembly districts); Cal. A.B. 301, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., ch. 535, 1981
Cal. Stat. 1905 (1981) (reapportionment of congressional districts); Cal. S.B. 99, 1983-84 Reg.
Sess., ch. 536, 1981 Cal. Stat. 1988 (1981) (reapportionment of State Senate districts). In June
1982, California voters successfully defeated the proposed reapportionment by a referendum
vote. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 15 (June 8, 1982). The California
Supreme Court nevertheless ordered that the defeated legislation be used in the 1982 elections
out of necessity. Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 678, 639 P.2d 939, 963, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 321, cert. denied and appealdismissed, 456 U.S. 941 (1982) As a result, 28 Democrats and 17 Republicans were elected to the House of Representatives under the now-defunct
legislation. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 666. By comparison, the makeup of the congressional
delegation prior to the 1982 election was 22 Democrats and 21 Republicans. Id. at 666 n.2.
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this apportionment scheme and directed the legislature to redraw con130
gressional boundaries.
In its second attempt at reapportionment, however, the Democratic
majority continued its partisan tactics, adopting procedures that locked
the public and the Republican minority out of the reapportionment process once again. 131 The maneuvering began after the election of a Republican governor in November 1982, when the outgoing Democratic
governor called the legislature into special session specifically to pass his
party's apportionment legislation. 132 The Democratic party conducted
the complicated mapmaking process alone, and the proposed districts
were described only by reference to thousands of census tracts, forcing
Republicans to conduct the cumbersome procedure of plotting the new
districts on maps if they wished to know the configuration of the districts. 133 The Democrats held no public hearings during the mapmaking

process, and no member of the Republican party sat on any committee. 134 The legislature passed the apportionment plan by a straight partyline vote. The outgoing Democratic governor signed the plan into law
135
two hours before he left office.

The district court in Badham began its analysis by holding that gerrymandering claims concerning congressional redistricting were justiciable. 136 Although Bandemer involved a challenge to state legislative
redistricting, 1 37 the Badham court found nothing in Bandemer's justiciability analysis that would distinguish congressional redistricting
from state legislative redistricting. 138 Next, the Badham court adopted
the standard for political gerrymandering set forth in Bandemer.139 The
court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged a discriminatory in130.

CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 15 (June 8, 1982). Under California

law, the state must conduct a referendum to approve or reject a statute if a sufficient number of
voters sign a petition within 90 days of the statute's enactment. CAL. CONST., art. II, §§ 9, 10.
131. The procedures adopted by California Democrats were strikingly similar to those
taken by the Republican majority in Indiana. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
132. Appellant's Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 4-5, Badham v. Eu, 749 F.2d 36 (9th
Cir.) (No. 84-1226), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985) (a copy is on file at The Hastings Law

Journal).
133. Id. at 4 & n.3.
134. Id.
135. Id. The bill passed the Assembly on a party-line vote of 41 to 29. One day later it
passed the Senate on a similar party-line vote of 21 to 10. Id.
136. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 667-68.
137. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986).
138. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 668. Although Bandemer represented only a plurality view
of the Court, with Justice O'Connor's concurrence arguing strongly against justiciability, 478
U.S. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring), Badham adopted the plurality's position in favor of
justiciability as the opinion of the Court. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 668.
139. Id. Badham treated the Bandemer plurality's standard as " 'constitut[ing] the holding of the Court and provid[ing] the governing standards.'" 694 F. Supp. at 669 (quoting
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977)).
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tent.140 As in Bandemer, therefore, the court focused much of its attention on whether there was proof of discriminatory effect.14 1 Concluding
that the Republicans had failed to establish a loss of power in the political process as a whole, the second prong of the Bandemer "effects" test,
the Badham court upheld the apportionment plan.142
Badham's application of the second prong of Bandemer's effects test
required the plaintiffs to show "strong indicia of lack of political power
and denial of fair representation." 143 The court required proof that the
majority would "entirely ignore" the interests of the minority. 144 In
striking down the California Republicans' claim, the court considered
the following factors in determining whether a minority group has lost its
power to influence the political process: (1) whether there had been any
interference with Republican organizing, fundraising, voting, and
campaigning; 145 (2) whether Republicans were free to speak out on issues
of public concern; 14 6 (3) overall Republican representation in Congress; 147 (4) the fact that California Republicans held positions such as
governor, United States senator, and President of the United States; 148
and (5) the availability of the referendum process. 149 After analyzing the
factors, Badham held that Republicans failed to satisfy the second prong
of Bandemer's "effects" test, that is, Republicans failed to establish that
they had been shut out of the political process as a whole.' 50
Thus, while Badham confirmed the justiciability of political gerrymandering, the court failed to provide sufficient guidance in interpreting
the merits of a gerrymandering claim. As in Bandemer, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim of discrimination and suggested a broad standard that would be required to be met for a successful political
gerrymandering claim. An alternative standard must be developed to
avoid an open invitation to gerrymandering in the future.
140. Id. at 669-70.
141. IL at 669-71.
142. Id. at 670. Because the court found that the Republicans failed to satisfy the second
prong of the "effects" test, it found it unnecessary to resolve the first prong of the test, which
calls for a showing of disproportionate election results over a period of time. Id.
143. Id. (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986)).
144. Id. at 670-71. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the gerrymander
violated article I,§ 2 of the Constitution and the "one person, one vote" standard, id.at 67375, and that it violated the first amendment's right to freedom of association. Id. at 675.
145. Id. at 670.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 672.
148. Id. In 1988, the year in which Badham was decided, the positions referred to were
held by Republicans: California Governor George Deukmejian, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN PoLrrics at 78 (National Journal ed. 1988) (elected 1982); California Senator Pete Wilson, id. at 80 (elected 1982); President Ronald Reagan, Congressional Quarterly's Guide to
U.S. Elections AT 365-66 (2D ED. 1985) (ELECTED 1980, REELECTED 1984).
149. Id. at 672-73.
150. Id. at 670.
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III. An Alternative Standard
As the 1990 census and the next reapportionment approach, few judicial standards are available to prevent legislators from gerrymandering.
In Davis v. Bandemer a splintered plurality failed to provide a clear standard to determine the existence of a political gerrymander. ' 5' When confronted with the issue again in Badham v. Eu, the Supreme Court
ultimately refused to review the issue. Thus, the judiciary still must develop a coherent standard of review for political gerrymandering claims.
Critical to the Court's analysis of gerrymandering claims is whether
the effect of a challenged apportionment plan discriminates against a
political group.152 In order to further define Bandemer's two-pronged
discriminatory effects test, the following standard should be applied: A
political group is discriminated against when it loses the power to elect a
representative of its choice over a prolonged period of time as a result of
the manipulation of legislative district boundaries.
The first prong of the "effects" test-disproportionate election losses
over a period of time-must ensure that prolonged losses are the result of
gerrymandering and not mere defeats at the polls. Therefore, these losses
must be the result of structural dilution. Moreover, a group challenging
an apportionment plan must represent a politically cohesive minority. In
the second prong of the "effects" test-the loss of power over the political process-the Court should redefine a loss of power as the loss of the
ability to elect a representative of one's choice, and not merely the power
to influence the process as a whole.
A. The First Prong of "Effects" Test: Ensuring That Prolonged Election
Losses Are the Result of Gerrymandering
The first prong of the effects test is designed to identify when political gerrymandering truly causes the loss of an election. To make this
identification, the courts must distinguish structural dilution--discrimination derived from the drawing of district lines-from the loss of an
election because of "special circumstances."'' 53 Special circumstances
are individual factors that may affect the outcome of a particular election, such as a strong incumbent, the lack of opposition, or a particularly
odious candidate.' 54 For this reason, courts will look for evidence of
structural dilution by distinguishing the loss of a single election from
continued disproportionate results. 155 In deciding whether there is struc151.
152.
153.

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133-34 (1986).
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129.
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 54 (1986).

154. Id.
155. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139-40 (1986); Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 57;
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971); see also Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 200 n.66 (1984) (authored
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1087

56
tural dilution, courts should consider the factors cited in Bandemer: 1
projections of future voting results; 157 unnatural district configurations; 15 8 and any other 1evidence
that indicated a design to lock a group
59
into its minority status.
Courts also should balance the plaintiff's burden of proving a continued frustration of the voter's will against the hardship of forcing plaintiffs to endure decades of defeat at the polls. Bandemer recognized this
balance when it held that the election "results" that show prolonged discrimination may be proven through projected results of future

elections. 160
In order for projections to be a viable tool, however, it is crucial to
establish reliable data on which to base these projections. In addition to
the large body of statistical information on gerrymandering that already
exists, 16 Bandemer's emphasis on the use of projections provides an opportunity for introducing new statistical models to prove discriminatory

effect. 162
Statistical models would not be effective, however, in legislative districts with a high percentage of "cross-over" voting in which voters of
one group regularly cast votes for candidates of another group. If large
numbers of voters regularly voted for opposing party candidates, courts
could not reliably predict that a minority party would continue to lose
elections as a result of an apportionment scheme. The plaintiffs in a gerrymandering claim, therefore, also must establish that their group votes
sufficiently as a bloc to constitute a politically cohesive group and that
majority group members vote sufficiently as a bloc to successfully defeat
the minority's preferred candidate.163 As an indication of what level of
by Howard Shapiro) ("the evil to be avoided is the subordination of minority groups in American politics, not the defeat of individuals in particular electoral contests").
156. These factors were proposed by Justice Powell in his dissent, Bandemer, 478 U.S. at
173, and incorporated by the plurality for the purpose of showing the discriminatory effects
required to prove a political gerrymandering claim. Id. at 141.
157. Id. at 141-42.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 139 n.17.
161. See supra note 110.
162. See, eg., Hess, supra note 70, at 219-26 (suggesting a "totality of circumstances test"
for identifying and adjudicating political gerrymander claims); R. Niemi & J. Wilkerson, Compactness and the 1980s Districts in the Indiana State House: Evidence of Political Gerrymandering, at 4 (using two statistical models-"dispersion measures" and "perimeter measures"to measure the compactness of Indiana legislative districts) (unpublished manuscript); R.
Niemi & S. Wright, Majority-Win Percentages: An Approach to the Votes-Seats Relationship
in Light of Davis v. Bandemer, at 2-3 (studying the ratio between the number of legislative
seats won versus the percentage of popular vote) (unpublished manuscript); C. Backstrom, L.
Robins & S. Eller, Establishing A Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, at 28 (unpublished

manuscript).
163. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 54-56 (1986). "If the minority group is not
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cross-over voting might be permissible, the Supreme Court has held that
bloc voting existed in the racial gerrymandering context despite crossover voting as high as thirty percent. 164
The first prong of the effects test, therefore, forces courts to look at
the voting patterns and political cohesiveness of the specific group challenging a particular apportionment plan. It is not enough to analyze
overall voting patterns of Democrats or Republicans nationwide.
Rather, courts must focus on whether Democrats or Republicans within
the challenged districts vote sufficiently as a bloc in order to determine
whether they are losing elections because these districts have been
gerrymandered.
B.

Second Prong of "Effects" Test and Redefining What Constitutes
"Power": The Loss of the Power to Elect a Representative

The second prong of the effects test requires that the group challenging an apportionment plan suffer a loss of power over the political process as a result of apportionment. In order to determine when a group
suffers discrimination because of an apportionment plan, it is essential to
define what constitutes "power."
(1) The Inadequacy of Bandemer and Badham Factors
The courts in Bandemer and Badham envisioned a broad definition
of how a group may influence the political process, thus frustrating any
group's attempt to establish a gerrymandering claim. Both courts discussed an array of activities that encompassed far more than representation in the legislative districts under dispute. The following discussion
analyzes the appropriateness of considering each of these factors.
One factor is the ability of a group to participate in its own primary
process. Both the Bandemer and Badham courts argued that members
of a group are not excluded from the political process if they are not
excluded from the "affairs of their own party or from the processes by
which candidates are nominated and elected."' 165 In a gerrymandered
district, political groups may remain free to participate in their own
party's primary process to select a candidate, but nevertheless may be
helpless to select the eventual winner of the general election. The alleged
politically cohesive, it cannot be said that [an apportionment plan] thwarts distinctive minority
group interests." Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 58-59 (emphasis on statistical data showing a correlation between the race of
the voter and the selection of certain candidates); see also Engstrom and Wildgen, Pruning
Thorns from the Thicket. An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering, 2
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 465, 469 (1977) (devising a procedure to assess the degree to which vote
dilution is a product of gerrymandering).
165. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 137; Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
aff'd mem., 109 S. Ct. 829 (1989) (noting the absence of allegations of interference with a
group's organizing, fundraising, voting, and campaigning efforts).
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discrimination is not lack of participation in one's own primary, however, but the inability to elect a representative as a result of unfair partisan maneuvers. 166 In gerrymandered districts, the winner is preordained.
The opposing party's primary process becomes nothing more than an
exercise in futility-the voter's true choice becomes that of selecting the
candidate who will have the honor of losing to the other party's

candidate. 167
Another factor the Bandemer and Badham courts considered was
the strength of the national political parties. Badham implicitly adopted
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Bandemer 168 by arguing.that general
strength of the national political parties is sufficient to withstand a gerrymandering claim. 169 Gerrymandering claims, however, are based on discrimination against a particular group of voters in a particular legislative
reapportionment scheme; therefore, courts should focus on whether voters from the challenged legislative reapportionment are "shut out of the
process." For instance, the fact that a racial minority may enjoy relative
political strength in New York or Illinois does not destroy protection for
racial groups in North Carolina 170 or Georgia.' 7 1 Similarly, the Republican majority in Indiana and the Democratic majority in California
should not be able to "cancel out" each state's respective minority parties. Gerrymandering claims, therefore, should be viewed in a regional
context rather than on a national scale to accurately address discriminatory apportionment schemes.
Another factor raised in Badham, is the political party's representation in other elected offices, such as governor, senator, and President.
Because election to these offices is held on a state-wide or national basis,
they do not involve reapportionment and, therefore, are not susceptible
to gerrymandering. By comparison, a political group seeking to strike
down a reapportionment plan does so because the plan reduces that
group's power in the legislative body that is elected on the basis of population distribution. A group's representation in other elected offices
might mitigate, but does not justify, the loss of power it suffers in reapportioned districts. Therefore, this factor should focus on representation
in the legislative districts under dispute-those involving apportionment.
166. Thomas Interview, supra note 74 ("Participation in one's own primary, regardless of
the resources available, still results in a challenger being locked out of the general election,
and, therefore, locked out of the process.").
167. Id.
168. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
169. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672 (because Republicans hold 40% of seats in Congress,
the California Republican party had "far more than mere token representation").
170. See, ag., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986).
171. See, eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622 (1982).
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Another factor, also considered in Badham, was the availability of
the referendum process to California Republicans. 172 Republicans had
led an earlier effort to overturn prior apportionment legislation in California through the referendum process 173 and, therefore, the court argued that "the California Republicans' political might demonstrates their
ability to protect themselves from political subjugation."' 174 The referendum process in Badham, however, was far from successful. Although
the prior apportionment legislation was rejected by referendum, the
Democratic majority in the legislature and the Democratic Governor
quickly passed nearly identical legislation in order to again gerrymander
against Republicans.175 Badham would require a group to repeatedly return to the costly and complex referendum process 1 76 in order to strike
down a gerrymandered apportionment plan and return the task of mapdrawing to the same legislators responsible for the original gerrymandering. 1 77 In addition, California's experience illustrates that such a
legislature will not be deterred from gerrymandering even inthe face of
prior widespread public rejection through the referendum process.
(2) The Loss of Power to Elect Representative of One's Choice
Since it first entered the thicket of political reapportionment in the
1960's, the Court has been concerned with ensuring fair representation. 78 The Court long has recognized that fairness cannot be achieved
when the voters' fundamental right to vote is infringed. 179 This principle
was reaffirmed in Thornburg v. Gingles.180
172.

Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672-73.

173.

CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 15

174.

Id. at 672.

(June 8, 1982).

175. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
176. Thomas Interview, supra note 74 (The referendum process exposes members of a
political group to a "costly, complex process which is vulnerable to being undermined through
campaign advertising, rhetoric, slurs, and distortions.").
177. In a related development, the California Supreme Court struck down the use of the
initiative process-the power of the electorate to propose bills and laws independent of the
legislature-in the context of legislative reapportionment. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal.
3d 658, 674, 669 P.2d 17, 27, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 790 (1983).
For further discussion on the limits imposed on the initiative process, see generally Note,
New Limits on the CaliforniaInitiative: An Analysis and Critique, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1045
(1986) (authored by Greg Salvato) (analysis of recent limits placed on the initiative process by
the California Supreme Court, including the Court's rejection of the use of the initiative to
enact a reapportionment statute); Eastman, Squelching Vox Populi: Judicial Review of the
Initiative in California, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV.529, 549-53 (1985) (author sets forth guidelines to prevent unwarranted judicial intrusion into the process).
178. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964) ("The achievement of fair and effective
representation for all citizens is ... the basic aim of legislative apportionment.").
179. Id.
180. 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1985).
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In Thornburg, decided the same day as Bandemer, the Court rejected the requirement that a group prove that it has lost its power to
influence the process as a whole. 18 1 Rather, the Thornburg Court expressly found that, in a racial gerrymandering claim, voters are discriminated against if their opportunity to "elect representatives of their
choice" is impaired. 182 Furthermore, the Court's recognized that the
loss of a group's power to elect a representative "allows those elected to
183
ignore [minority] interests without fear of political consequences."
The purpose of gerrymandering is to win elections whether the target minority groups are racial or political. The discriminatory effect of
gerrymandering is that voters in the minority unfairly lose elections. The
Thornburg standard is the most reasonable and objective standard for
identifying discriminatory vote dilution because the focus is on whether
an identifiable group's power to elect a representative has been impaired.
The discriminatory effect of gerrymandering, whether motivated by
racial or political factors, is that the ability of voters in the minority to
elect representatives is unfairly diluted. The loss of power to elect a representative, as the Thornburg Court perceived, necessarily involves a loss
of influence held by that group. By advocating a standard based on a
group's loss of power to influence the process as a whole, the Bandemer
and Badham courts wrongly overlooked the interrelationship between
the power to elect and the power to influence.
For example, when a group loses its power to elect a representative,
it is consigned to minority status in the House or Assembly. The minority party is shut out of the processes that determine how and by whom all
substantive legislative decisionmaking takes place. The minority party
has no power to determine the leader of the House or Assembly, the
chairpersons of congressional committees, and the relative numbers of
members of those committees. In short, a minority party is excluded
from the machinery that drives the political engine.18 4 Thus, the power
of a group to elect a candidate has a critical impact on the amount of
181. Id. at 64-70.
182. Id. at 48.
183. Id. at 48 n.14 (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982)).
184. A one-time aide to former Democratic congressman and Speaker of the House
Thomas P. O'Neill summed up the Republican party's lack of power in Congress as a minority
political party:
For 34 years, ever since they lost control of the body, GOP congressmen have felt the
humiliation common to all who have suffered racial and ethnic repression. While
Republican members share the same legal rights as Democrats, they are denied any
real-life political power. They can never chair a committee or even a subcommittee.
With their party denied any say in what bills reach the floor, when and if votes are
scheduled, success as a legislator depends almost entirely on the kindness of strangers: in other words, the Democratic leadership.
Matthews, Cheney Escapes Republican Ghetto, San Francisco Examiner, March 19, 1989, at
A-19, col. 1.
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influence it can wield. This requires that a court follow the lead of
Thornburg and consider whether a group's power to elect, as well as its
power to influence, has been impaired by political gerrymandering.
Furthermore, the Thornburg Court's concern that gerrymandering
rendered politicians unaccountable to minority interests also has significance in the context of partisan reapportionment schemes. In Bandemer,
the Court assumed that a group that voted for a losing candidate would
have as much opportunity to influence the winning candidate as other
voters in the district. This assertion may be applicable in a non-gerrymandered district because votes in those areas are less assured. Thus,
politicians still have an interest in addressing minority interests. Gerrymandering, on the other hand, creates safe districts by decreasing the
opposing group's power to threaten or influence the majority party. By
guaranteeing incumbents their positions, gerrymandering perpetuates a
lack of concern for minorities, whether racial or political. As Thornburg
asserted, therefore, minority groups are discriminated against when an
apportionment plan "minimize[s] or cancel[s] out their ability to elect
185
their preferred candidates."'
Conclusion
Because a majority political party wields tremendous power in the
legislative process, there is a strong incentive for the majority to maintain
a margin of even one seat over the minority party. Gerrymandering has
often been used as a tool to maintain this advantage. Nearly thirty years
ago, the Supreme Court struck down malapportionment. It later struck
down racial gerrymandering by legislatures as an impermissible method
of dominating racial minorities. In the 1980's, in Davis v. Bandemer and
Badham v. Eu the Court has finally begun to address the problem of
political gerrymandering. The Court has, nevertheless, failed to recognize the importance to a party of maintaining control over the legislative
process. The Court must recognize that a group is shut out of the political process when it loses the power to elect a representative of its choice
over a prolonged period of time as a result of the manipulation of legislative district boundaries.
If the courts continue in the direction of Bandemer and Badham,
the reapportionment following the 1990 census could result in chaos.
Bandemer and Badham have the dual effect of encouraging minority
groups to bring political gerrymandering claims and failing to discourage
legislators from gerrymandering. The courts' ruling on the justiciability
of political gerrymandering provides a forum for minority groups'
claims. At the same time, Bandemer and Badham established a loose
standard for determining a group's participation in and influence on the
185.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48 (1986).
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political process, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to bring a
gerrymandering claim successfully. As a result, the Bandemer/Badham
standard will not discourage legislators from continuing to gerrymander.
The Supreme Court now has two alternatives: it may choose to
close the courtroom doors once again and let the issue be resolved in the
political arena, or it may provide a clear, reasonable standard to guide
legislatures and discourage future gerrymandering. The first option is
not viable because it would require the reversal of twenty-seven years of
judicial involvement in apportionment. Consistency demands that the
Court act. Now that it has opened its doors to political gerrymandering,
the Court should speak clearly to legislators whose actions will determine
the future contours of the legislative landscape.

